Writer: Hardianto Widyo Priohutomo, M.I.P. (Director of Southeast Asia Studies, InMind Institute)
When the United States Secretary of State and China’s Foreign Minister visited Jakarta within a short span of time, what unfolded was not a mere diplomatic coincidence. It was a signal that Indonesia has once again become a contested arena in a shifting world order. Amid that pressure, one fundamental question demands an honest answer: is the principle of bebas aktif (free and active), which has served as the backbone of Indonesia’s foreign policy for seven decades, still relevant, or has it quietly become a comfortable refuge from genuine strategic responsibility?
A Legacy in Need of Reinterpretation
Free and active foreign policy was born from the spirit of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, a declaration of independence against two ideological blocs locked in Cold War confrontation. Mohammad Hatta articulated it with clarity: Indonesia was not free without direction, but actively committed to world peace grounded in sovereign national interest. In that context, free meant unbound to any power, and active meant refusing to remain idle.
The 21st century, however, is far more complex than Cold War bipolarity. The rivalry between the United States and China is not merely an ideological contest. It is a struggle for supremacy across technology, global supply chains, digital narratives, and the international law of the sea. In this landscape, neutrality without substantive positioning is no longer a strategy. It is a vacuum that other powers will readily fill.
Between Principle and Pragmatism
Indonesia often takes pride in being a friend to all and an enemy to none. In multilateral forums, the country speaks fluently about multilateralism, rules-based order, and peaceful resolution of disputes. Yet at the same time, Indonesia remains absent from the concrete mechanisms that actually determine the shape of that order.
When China expanded its claims in the South China Sea and encroached directly on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the Natuna waters, Jakarta’s response tended to be bilateral and contained, avoiding the internationalization of a conflict that was already international in nature. When AUKUS was formed and dramatically redrawn the security map of the region, Indonesia voiced skepticism but offered no concrete alternative for regional security architecture. When Washington launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, Indonesia joined, but with measured and ambiguous commitment.
This pattern reflects a structural dilemma. Indonesia seeks to keep every door open, yet risks having no meaningful seat at any table.
ASEAN as a Vehicle, Not a Shelter
For decades, Indonesia has positioned ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, a principally sound choice that in practice has often served as a justification for avoiding firm positions. ASEAN’s consensus principle, celebrated as collective wisdom, frequently transforms into collective paralysis, disabling the region’s capacity to respond meaningfully to real crises, from the South China Sea to the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Myanmar.
As the largest country in ASEAN, with a population of 280 million, the region’s largest GDP, and a geographic position that controls critical maritime straits, Indonesia possesses the capital to be an agenda-setter rather than merely a consensus-builder. Indonesia’s leadership during its 2023 ASEAN Chairmanship demonstrated that capacity exists. Yet it has not been converted into sustained structural influence.
New Dimensions That Cannot Be Ignored
21st century global rivalry does not play out solely on conventional military and diplomatic terrain. Three new dimensions demand that Indonesia adopt a more clearly defined posture.
The first is technology and digital infrastructure. The competition between American and Chinese technology ecosystems, spanning semiconductors, artificial intelligence, 5G networks, and undersea cables, is reshaping the strategic dependencies of nations. Indonesia, as Southeast Asia’s largest digital market, cannot pretend that technology choices are merely commercial decisions.
The second is energy transition and climate geopolitics. Indonesia is among the world’s largest producers of nickel, the mineral at the heart of global electric vehicle battery supply chains. This position confers extraordinary strategic leverage, but it also draws Indonesia into fierce competition between supply chains oriented toward Beijing and those oriented toward Washington. The downstream mineral processing policy championed by the government points in the right direction, but it must be supported by a more coherent framework of economic diplomacy.
The third is the information order and narrative sovereignty. In an era of cross-border information warfare and disinformation, a country’s ability to protect the integrity of its public sphere is itself an expression of sovereignty. Indonesia needs a clearer position in global internet governance debates, rather than reactively responding to content deemed harmful on a case-by-case basis.
A Mature Free and Active Policy
Rereading free and active foreign policy does not mean abandoning it. On the contrary, it means restoring the spirit of active that has too often been swallowed by a passive interpretation of free.
A mature free and active policy in the 21st century should take three concrete forms. First, the courage to take positions grounded in national interest and humanitarian values, rather than simply avoiding confrontation. Second, the capacity to build strategic coalitions across the region that are not bound to any bloc but serve concrete and defined objectives. Third, serious investment in diplomatic capability, including human resources, strategic intelligence, and a professional and sustained foreign policy infrastructure.
Indonesia must stop measuring diplomatic success solely by how many parties were left unoffended, and begin measuring it by how effectively national interests are secured and how meaningfully the country contributes to regional stability.
Conclusion: The Need for Strategic Courage
Hatta once affirmed that Indonesia could not remain a spectator in the world’s upheavals. Those words were spoken seven decades ago, yet their urgency has only grown. Amid a global rivalry that increasingly divides the world into rigid spheres of influence, Indonesia needs more than skill in maintaining balance. It needs strategic courage, the willingness to define clearly where Indonesia stands, what it is fighting for, and how its national power will be deployed in service of those aims. Free and active foreign policy is not a museum artifact to be preserved unchanged. It is a compass. And like all compasses, its purpose is not to keep us standing still, but to ensure we are moving in the right direction.
Views: 9